Proof of Lemma 3.1 For the opposition leader, L, to accept an offer from the incumbent, I, and demobilize, then
I is willing to offerx as long as V I (m = 0, x =x) ≥ V I (m = 1). His continuation value from permitting opposition mobilization is .
In comparison, the continuation value from striking a deal is
, which simplifies to
(1−δ)(1−δ+δφ) . Therefore, the incumbent prefers to meet L's demand ofx when
. This results in
, which is always true since −c L cannot be larger than c I . Hence, I always offersx as long asx
Lastly, to show that x =x and m = 0 iff x ≥x is an equilibrium, this strategy profile must survive one-shot deviation:
, which always holds since this is equal to the optimal demand made by L. Therefore, this stationary strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium. ∎ Proof of Proposition 4.1 The continuation value of the rival leader (R) from mounting a challenge, V R (h = 1), must exceed 0 for R to compete for party leadership. R ′ s continuation value comprises the costs in the current period of mounting a challenge and the discounted payoffs of mobilizing in all future periods, which he receives with probability φ:
and R mounts a challenge when −q +
for values of φ ≥ φ * , where φ * = q δ(q+z−c R ) , R chooses h = 1, and h = 0 otherwise. Lastly, when φ * > 1, then R never mounts a challenge since φ cannot be sufficiently large to sustain internal competition. This occurs when q > . Yet, V I (m = 0, x =x) = 1 −x + δV I (m = 0), which simplifies to 1−x 1−δ . Therefore, I offersx when
. This results inx ≤
, which is always true since −c L cannot be larger than c I . Hence, I always offersx as long asx ∈ [0, 1].
Lastly, to show that x =x and m = 0 iff x ≥x is an equilibrium when φ < φ * , this strategy profile must survive one-shot deviation:
, which always holds since this is equal to the optimal demand made by L. Therefore, this stationary strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium. ∎ Proof of Proposition 4.2 As shown in the Proof of Proposition 4.1, the rival leader mounts a challenge when φ ≥ φ * . In this case, the leader's continuation value from cooptation
Since there is a chance that L is removed in the current period, then she only receives the current and future payoffs of cooptation with
1−δφ , as in the baseline model. Therefore, the opposition cooperates when
This inequality is true for any value of x ≥x, wherex = (z−c L )(1−δ+δφ)
(1−δφ)(1−φ) . As in the baseline model,x < 0 when c L > z, leading to unilateral cooperation.x > 1 when z > I is willing to offerx as long as V I (m = 0, x =x) ≥ V I (m = 1). The continuation value from permitting opposition mobilization is the same as in the baseline model:
the leader faces a challenge, the deal is temporarily undermined, leading to one period of disorganization (a payoff of 1 for I) followed by permanent mobilization, with probability φ.
The deal remains intact and cooptation occurs with probability 1 − φ. This payoff simplifies
(1−φ)(1−δφ) , which is only true when φ ≤
. Therefore, there are some values for which I chooses to permit mobilization, unlike in the baseline model. Lastly, to show that x =x and m = 0 iff x ≥x is an equilibrium when φ ≥ φ * , this strategy profile must survive one-shot deviation:
(1−φ)(1−δφ) , which always holds since this is equal to the optimal demand made by L. Therefore, this stationary strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium. ∎
Comparative Statics for Figures 1 and 2
The left panel of Figure 1 graphs the optimal demand of concessions-the concessions thresholdx-for the opposition leader, as defined in Lemma 3.1, for various levels of regime vulnerability z. Each line is plotted with the following values held constant: c L = 0.1 and δ = 1 (i.e. there is no discounting), while the top line is set at φ = 0.75 and the bottom line is set at φ = 0.25 as labeled. However, the dashed line represents the demanded concessions when there is no activist base that influences the opposition leader's political survival. In this case V L (m = 0, x =x) = 
